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There are many ways to categorise conspiracy theories. In the present study, we examined
individual and demographic predictors of beliefs in commercial conspiracy theories among
a British sample of over 300 women and men. Results showed many people were cynical
and sceptical with regard to advertising tricks, as well as the tactics of organisations
like banks and alcohol, drug and tobacco companies. Beliefs sorted into four identifiable
clusters, labelled sneakiness, manipulative, change-the-rules and suppression/prevention.
The high alpha for the overall scale suggested general beliefs in commercial conspiracy.
Regressions suggested that those people who were less religious, more left-wing, more
pessimistic, less (self-defined as) wealthy, less Neurotic and less Open-to-Experience
believed there was more commercial conspiracy. Overall the individual difference variables
explained relatively little of the variance in these beliefs. The implications of these findings
for the literature on conspiracy theories are discussed. Limitations of the study are also
discussed.
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COMMERCIAL CONSPIRACY THEORIES
Conspiracy theories are beliefs that attribute the ultimate
cause or concealment of an event or behavioural pattern
from public knowledge, to secret, unlawful, and malevolent
plots or processes, usually by multiple actors working together
(Zonis and Joseph, 1994). Beliefs in conspiracy theories are
widespread across the globe (Hofstadter, 1965; Moynihan, 1985;
Graumann and Moscovici, 1987; Goertzel, 1994; Robins and
Post, 1997; Byford and Billig, 2001; Byford, 2011; Swami et al.,
2011), although they appear to be prominent in the West,
particularly in America where the film industry has been
implicated in spreading theories in the Cold War and the
McCarthyism periods. It is also there that most commercial con-
spiracy theories appear to originate and thrive, especially those
concerned with subliminal advertising (Crook, 2004). As a con-
sequence there are numerous books that warn people about
how advertisers and retailers attempt to “subliminally” influ-
ence people, such as that by Howard (2005) with the subti-
tle “The secret tactics that influence what you buy, think and
believe.”
There are many ways to codify or classify conspiracy theories:
event based vs. systemic; past vs. present vs. future; inside vs. out-
side forces; natural vs. supernatural; idiosyncratic vs. shared, as
well as area specific: i.e., religious, political, health or commercial.
This study will examine conspiracy theories concerned with busi-
ness and commercial organizations that are seen to use devious,
hidden and possibly illegal methods to persuade people to buy
their products. It appears as if there is very little research in this
area and this pilot study hopes to encourage more work in this
neglected topic of conspiracy research.
Those who share conspiracy theories argue that it is usually
naïve to believe in the official version of events because govern-
ments and corporations are Machiavellian manipulators of the
media who often try to keep people in a state of ignorance and
fear. Those with a “cover-up” as opposed to a “conspiracy theory”
mindset accuse others of demonising them and being close-
minded, whereas what they are doing is actually holding those
in power to account and reclaiming history. They are often moti-
vated by strong socio-political and religious ideologies (Byford,
2011).
It has been argued that conspiracy theories are psychologi-
cally functional in that they help individuals attain or maintain
a sense of meaning, control and personal security (Newheiser
et al., 2011). Miller (2002) suggests that conspiracy theories fulfil
two essentially cognitive roles: an argumentative role and a social
critique role. Shermer (2010) argued that in general conspiracy
theories are held by people with four traits: patternicity (the ten-
dency to find meaningful patterns in random noise), agenticity
(the beliefs that the world is controlled by an/many invisible,
intentional agent(s); confirmation bias (the strong preference to
seek/find conformational evidence for what they believe) and
hindsight bias (tailoring after-the-fact explanations to what they
already know happened).
This study is on commercial conspiracy theories. There are
many theories in this area, though most involve marketing tricks
(Jacobson and Mazur, 1995) or more generally subliminal influ-
ences in shops, the media and the web (Howard, 2005). A great
deal of this work concerns advertising (Crook, 2004) and the
debate as to the efficacy of subliminal advertising on radio and
television (Verwijmeren et al., 2011; Legal et al., 2012). There are
many web-based sites which suggest that drug, food, and energy
companies take part in massive and frequent cover-ups con-
cerning their advertising and the information that they spread.
Others are very product and event specific, such as the introduc-
tion and subsequent withdrawal of New Coke by the Coca Cola
company (Hays, 2004). There are books designed to alert or inoc-
ulate people against commercial tactics such as that by Howard
(2005).
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PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE
Until recently there were few books with a psychological perspec-
tive on conspiracy theories (Byford, 2011). Some early works trace
beliefs in conspiracy theories to feelings of powerlessness, partic-
ularly among marginalised people who believe they have become
voiceless (Hofstadter, 1965). Various studies have shown that con-
spiracy theories are indeed associated with political cynicism,
authoritarianism and support for democratic principles (Swami
et al., 2010; Swami, 2012; Swami and Furnham, 2012).
Other early work suggested that beliefs in conspiracy theories
serve self-esteem maintenance purposes (Young, 1990; Robins
and Post, 1997), while providing believers an outlet for reasserting
their individualism (Melley, 2000) or for the expression of nega-
tive feelings (Hofstadter, 1965; Ungerleider and Wellisch, 1979).
Recently Swami and Furnham (2012) found conspiracy beliefs
in one famous story- the disappearance of Amelia Earheart-
were associated with lower self-esteem and lower self-estimated
intelligence.
Few studies have attempted to examine the individual dif-
ference correlates of beliefs in conspiracies (Goertzel, 1994;
Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Crocker et al., 1999). In general, these
studies showed that belief in conspiracist ideas were correlated
with anomia, low levels of interpersonal trust, feelings of social
and political alienation, and perceptions of being disadvantaged.
Some more recent studies have shown conspiracist beliefs related
to the personality disorders (schizotypy) (Darwin et al., 2011) and
also to personality. Studies using the Big Five personality traits
have tended to show small but significant associations between
two traits- Agreeableness and Openness- and beliefs in conspiracy
theories (Swami et al., 2010, 2011).
Overall the psychological studies on individual difference cor-
relates of specific conspiracy theories have confirmed various
hypotheses but have also shown that any or all of the variables
identified have been very modestly related to the endorsement of
the theories accounting in total for less than around a fifth of the
variance (Swami et al., 2010, 2011).
THE PRESENT STUDY
The present study was conceived as a preliminary attempt to
investigate correlates of some commercial conspiracy theories. In
the present study, the focus was on personality and ideological
variables, in the expectation that general psychological traits allow
for the construction of a profiling model of conspiracist individ-
uals. Specifically the study examined (among a British sample)
the association of 30 commercial conspiracy beliefs, the “Big Five”
personality factors, and personal ideology as defined by beliefs in
politics, religion, self-perceived wealth and optimism/pessimism.
Two hypotheses guided the selection of variables in the present
work. First, it was expected that politically left-wing, less reli-
gious, and more pessimistic people would be more likely to
endorse commercial conspiracy theories. In many studies of peo-
ple who chose alternative and complementary medicine and were
suspicious of, and cynical about, orthodox medicine, Vincent
and Furnham (1997) found two simple questions concerning
political and religious beliefs to consistently account for reason-
able amounts of variance. The less religious and more politi-
cally left wing seemed most distrustful of orthodox medicine
and its dependence on drug companies, and were instead in
favour of alternative therapies. Second, it was expected that low
Agreeableness and high Openness scores would be significantly
associated with commercial conspiracy theories as various studies
have shown these associations (Swami et al., 2010, 2011).
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Three hundred and twenty four individuals took part in the
present study, of which 214 were women. Their average age was
23.42 years (SD = 10.16) ranging from 18 to 65. Just over half
were young people in education and the remainder came from a
variety of occupations. Asked how religious they were (1 = “Not
at all” to 10 = “Very”) they scored 4.14 (SD = 2.82); their polit-
ical orientation (1 = “Strongly Right Wing” to 10 = “Strongly
Left Wing”) scored 5.51 (SD = 1.66); their personal optimism
(1 = “Optimistic” to 10 = “Pessimistic”) was 4.26 (SD = 2.12)
and Self-perceived wealth (1 = “Rich” to 10 = “Poor”) 5.02
(SD = 1.64).
MEASURES
Belief in commercial conspiracy theories inventory
This is a 30-item, novel questionnaire devised for this study. The
limited literature was consulted and over 60 potential items writ-
ten. These were obtained from various websites but also books on
anti-commercialism and advertising tactics (Jacobson andMazur,
1995; Howard, 2005). These initial items were Q sorted by two
people to get some idea of the categories the items were cov-
ering. They were then given to 10 people to complete with the
instructions to be highly critical of the clarity of the statements
and response scale. Those items that were unclear as well as those
that showed floor and ceiling effects were discarded. Floor and
ceiling effects were defined by the mean score suggesting that
nearly all people in the pilot study either thought these activities
virtually never (mean score >5.5) or very regularly (mean score
<1.5) occurred. This left 30 items, which can be seen in Table 1.
Participants are required to rate how regularly (1 = Very to 6 =
Never) a number of practices they believed occurred.
Abbreviated, 15-item Big Five Questionnaire (e.g., Furnham
et al., 2003). This is a brief scale for assessing the Big Five
personality factors, suitable for looking at population-level cor-
relations. It was chosen in this study because it yields accept-
ably reliable scores yet is very brief. The five personality factors
were arrived at by summing certain items, and alpha coefficients
were as follows: Openness α = 0.57, Conscientiousness α = 0.52,
Extraversion α = 0.60, Agreeableness α = 0.5, and Neuroticism
α = 0.67. These alpha coefficients are not ideal, but it should be
remembered that they were calculated using three items each and
that they are in line with population norms reported in previous
work (e.g., Furnham et al., 2003).
PROCEDURE
Ethical committee permission was sought and received.
Participants were approached in two settings: lectures to a
variety of groups given by the author (where around 40% of the
sample was obtained) and in two large London railway stations
where people waiting were approached. The questionnaire took
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Table 1 | Means and Standard Deviations for each of the 30 items.
No. Statement Mean SD
1 Placing the word “sex” very subtly in advertisements to attract your attention 3.10 1.35
2 Advertisers flashing subliminal (below consciousness) images in television advertisements 3.44 1.37
3 Supermarkets using undetectable gasses (smells) in shops to change a person’s mood to encourage sales 3.96 1.52
4 Advertisers targeting specific audiences through their choice of timing of advertisements in programs 1.69 1.01
5 Shops tricking you with pricing: i.e., putting up prices for a few minutes, then down claiming big discounts 2.43 1.42
6 Junk mailers using “sneaky tactics” to get people to open the envelope 2.52 1.42
7 Advertisers disguising their ads in envelopes appearing to be official government documents 3.75 1.53
8 Alcohol and tobacco companies sponsoring various events to appeal to particular groups 2.61 1.49
9 Drug companies falsifying their data on the effectiveness of their drugs 3.45 1.41
10 Drug companies bribing doctors with presents and conferences to prescribe their drugs 3.50 1.60
11 Tobacco companies actually approving of cigarette smuggling 4.09 1.40
12 Tobacco companies trying to get around the advertising laws in every country 3.00 1.43
13 Various companies (mining, tobacco, drug) bribing politicians in any country they can to get laws passed to protect them 3.12 1.40
14 Drug companies torturing millions of animals in trials 3.08 1.43
15 Companies selling medically prescribed drugs which they know are addictive 2.91 1.37
16 Oil Companies deliberately suppressing better car technology that uses less fuel 3.29 1.31
17 Oil companies encouraging politicians to invade countries to take their oil 3.69 1.45
18 Manufacturers using copy-cat product packing to trick shoppers into buying more 2.50 1.23
19 Light bulb companies preventing technological advances into producing longer-lasting light bulbs 3.64 1.36
20 Governments banning certain third world product not because they are unsafe but because they complete too well 3.26 1.37
21 Government guidelines setting poor diet guidelines so that the medical industry generates drug and treatment revenue in
unhealthy patients
4.32 1.37
22 Oil companies intentionally ignoring oil reserves to create the illusion of scarcity that keeps prices high 3.33 1.37
23 Manufacturers adding Illegal additives to foods (i.e., some brand of crisps) to make them addictive 3.45 1.51
24 Effective alternative medicines being rejected by medical councils to maximize revenue 3.50 1.40
25 Drug companies getting normal behaviour being called a disorder so they can invent drugs to cure it 3.74 1.45
26 Food companies being dishonest about genetically modified food 3.03 1.34
27 Banks manipulating inflation and other figures to make more profit 2.93 1.46
28 Lawyers knowing lying on behalf of their clients 2.21 1.18
29 Shops faking “sell-by” dates to make more profit 3.24 1.49
30 Jews working in high-power jobs in the media spreading propaganda to gain support for Israel 4.13 1.49
Scale: 6 = Never to 1 = Very regularly.
around 5min to complete. Overall the response rate was around
80%. Where possible participants were thanked and debriefed
after they had anonymously and voluntarily completed the
questionnaire.
RESULTS
The results for the individual items are shown in Table 1. Three
were seen to occur relatively regularly (items 4, 5, and 28), some
relatively frequently (item 6, 8, 15, 18, and 27) and three rarely
(items 11, 21, and 30).
Two attempts were made to investigate the underlying struc-
ture of the items. First, both oblique (promax) and orthogonal
(varimax) rotated factor analytic statistics were calculated. Second
aQ-sort test was done by two people trying to determine the con-
tent structure of the questionnaire. None of the factor analyses
yielded clearly interpretable factors, though the Q-sort did. Both
had five categories. Only where there was internal agreement that
items belong in the same category were they retained and this left
four categories. Four sets of items were grouped together under
four labels: Sneakiness (items 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 18, 28); Manipulative
(items 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 23, 26, 29); Changing the Rules (items
12, 13, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27) and Suppression/Prevention (items 16,
19, 22, 25, 30). These four scales were intercorrelated—the high-
est being between factors 2 and 3 (r = 0.68) and the lowest being
between factors 1 and 3 (r = 0.34). The alpha coefficients were
then calculated for each factor in turn and they were: 0.64, 0.73,
0.69, and 0.63, respectively. The Alpha for the whole scale of 30
items was also calculated and this was 0.86, suggesting evidence
of a monological commercial conspiracy belief system.
Next a correlation matrix was calculated between the gender,
four personal ratings (religion, politics, optimism, and wealth),
the big five personality factors and the four conspiracy factors and
total conspiracy score. Few were significant. These are shown in
Table 2.
Finally a series of five regressions was performed with the four
conspiracy factor scores and the total conspiracy score as the cri-
terion variables and three sets of predictor variables: sex and age,
the four self ratings and the Big Five factor scores. Three were
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Table 2 | Correlations between beliefs, personality and the factors.
R P Opt W N E Ope A C F1 F2 F3
Religiosity (R)
Politics (P) −0.05
Optimism (Opt) 0.18 −0.15
Wealth (W) 0.01 0.00 0.28
Neuroticism (N) 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.04
Extraversion (E) 0.07 0.00 −0.17 0.03 −0.01
Openness (Ope) 0.05 0.19 0.10 −0.02 −0.04 0.09
Agreeableness (A) −0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 −0.10 0.11 0.06
Conscientiousness (C) 0.06 −0.16 −0.11 −0.04 −0.08 0.08 0.00 −0.10
Factor 1 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.08 −0.09 −0.05 −0.13 0.03
Factor 2 −0.05 0.08 −0.03 −0.25 −0.04 0.00 −0.02 0.06 0.06 0.34
Factor 3 −0.12 0.05 −0.07 −0.10 −0.10 −0.11 −0.07 0.13 0.13 0.34 0.68
Factor 4 −0.08 0.01 0.00 −0.17 −0.11 0.02 −0.18 0.13 0.13 0.36 0.61 0.61
significant. The regression for the second factor (Manipulative)
was significant [F(9, 235) = 2.23, p < 0.05, AdjR2 = 0.08] show-
ing that those who rated themselves poorer (β = −0.28, t =
3.20, p < 0.001) believed more this more strongly. The fourth
factor (Suppression/Prevention) was also significant [F(9, 236) =
3.42, p < 0.001, AdjR2 = 0.14]. The results showed that those
who endorsed this factor tended to be less religious (β = −0.19,
t = 2.33, p < 05), more pessimistic (β = 0.23, t = 2.40, p <
0.01), poorer (β = −0.25, t = 2.99, p < 0.01), less Neurotic (β =
−0.22, t = 2.67, p < 0.01) and less Optimistic (β = −0.24, t =
2.81, p < 0.01).
The total score regression was also significant [F(9.229) = 2.19,
p < 0.05, AdjR2 = 0.08). There were three significant predictors.
Those who endorsed commercial conspiracies were politically left
wing (β = 0.18, t = 1.94, p < 0.05), more pessimistic (β = 0.22,
t = 2.12, p < 05) and rated themselves as poorer (β = −0.25,
t = 2.73, p < 0.001). Two other variables narrowly missed sig-
nificance: those who were less religious (β = −0.15, t = −1.70,
p = 0.09) and those who were less Open-to-Experience (β =
−0.16, t = 1.78, p = 0.07) endorsed the idea of commercial
conspiracies.
DISCUSSION
This was very much a pilot study: a first attempt to investi-
gate commercial conspiracy theories. The evidence from other
work seems to suggest that people tend to be general, rather
than specific, conspiracy theorists in the sense that if they
appear to believe in one theory they believe in many (Byford,
2011). Indeed Swami et al. (2011) showed that people who
tended to believe in conspiracy theories also endorsed a com-
pletely fictitious theory made up for experimental purposes.
It is probable that those who endorse commercial conspiracy
theories also endorse various other conspiracy theories like sci-
entific, criminal, political, religious, and popular culture con-
spiracy theories. In this study the alpha for the whole scale was
high, indicating that irrespective of the particular type of con-
spiracy identified, people tended to respond in a similar way.
In this sense it may not be that there are unique and dis-
tinct findings for studies on commercial conspiracy theories
because the same individual difference correlates are implicated
in beliefs about all conspiracy theories. However, this thesis merits
testing.
There was some support for the hypotheses, though it was not
strong or consistent. More left-wing, less religious, poorer and
pessimistic people endorsed the frequency of conspiracy theories
more frequently. They tended to be more Open-to-Experience as
predicted but there were no correlations for Agreeableness. It has
been shown that more cynical and marginalised people are more
likely to agree with conspiracist ideas. Left wing people are often
highly sceptical of business and commercial organisations which
may explain that association (Byford, 2011). Similarly it could
be that the optimism-pessimism and self-assessed wealth (from
rich to poor) scores in this study related to belief in conspiracy
because of the established finding that conspiracy theories (of all
types) thrive among the alienated, disenchanted and dispossessed
(Byford, 2011).
Other similar studies in this area have tended to show that
although personality and belief variables have been shown to
be significantly related to various specific, mainly event-based,
conspiracy theories, the size of the correlations/beta weights
tended to be small, suggesting that they account for a rela-
tively small amount of the variance. Thus, Swami et al. (2010)
found weak but significant and direct effects of Agreeableness,
Political Cynicism and Attitudes to Authority correlates of 9/11
conspiracy theories. The same was true of a study looking at
the 7/7 conspiracy theories where correlations between person-
ality and belief variables and conspiracy ideation never exceeded
r = 0.25 (Swami et al., 2011). A similar set of results was
found in a study of conspiracy theories about Amelia Earhart
(Swami and Furnham, 2012).
This all begs the question for differential psychologists: what
factors, be they ability, preference or motivational factors, actually
account for “reasonable” amounts of variance in many conspir-
acy theories? The psychological studies in this area have not been
able to identify any factor or experiences which seem to be able
to account for anything over 10% of the common variance. It
is possible that a social psychological rather than a differential
psychological approach to conspiracy theories is more useful.
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This study has a number of self-evident limitations. The sam-
ple was neither large nor representative of the population as a
whole, so threatening the generalizability of the results. Second,
the questionnaire needs both editing and expansion to ensure that
a wider range of commercial conspiracy theories is tested. Many
of the items were not strictly about conspiracies, such as items 4,
6, 7, and 8, which concernmodern daymarketing and advertising.
It may have been better to address some very specific economic
and business conspiracy theories like the idea that food compa-
nies are lying about genetically modified crops and planning to try
to take control the world’s food supply. Considerable work needs
to be done to devise a robust and reliable measure of commercial
conspiracy theories.
Third, it would have been desirable to obtain more informa-
tion about the participants as well as their beliefs about a host
of issues, particularly their attitudes to other conspiracy theories.
Studies in this tradition have not been very successful at identify-
ing factors that account for much (say a quarter or more) of the
variance in beliefs in conspiracy stories. It is hoped that this pilot
study encourages more empirical research in the area.
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